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i. introduction
in iTs landmark decision holding ThaT non-ciTizens deTained as “enemy combaTanTs” aT guanTánamo bay have a con-sTiTuTional righT To peTiTion The federal courTs for a wriT 
of habeas corpus challenging Their deTenTion, the Supreme 
Court in Boumediene v. Bush1 expressly invalidated parts of 
section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA),2 the 
plain text of which would otherwise have precluded such suits.3 
In particular, the Court held that Congress had failed to provide 
an adequate alternative to habeas corpus, and that, as a result, 
the MCA violates the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, which 
protects the right of those who fall within its scope to challenge 
the legality of their detention unless there has been a formal 
“suspension” of the writ — an extraordinary measure that can 
only occur “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [when] the public 
Safety may require it.” 4 
Unsurprisingly, a number of questions have arisen in 
Boumediene’s aftermath concerning just how broadly the 
Court’s reasoning sweeps. In particular, there has been substan-
tial wrangling in recent months over what remains of section 7 
— and whether the MCA still precludes the Guantánamo detain-
ees from bringing any lawsuit potentially outside the scope of 
the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, including challenges to 
the conditions of their confinement.5
Whereas virtually all of the post-Boumediene focus has 
thus been on detainees challenging aspects of their detention, a 
separate but no less important question has arisen in the context 
of the military commissions created by the MCA, on which 
Congress conferred both personal and subject-matter jurisdic-
tion far broader than any U.S. military commission has previ-
ously exercised — and perhaps broader than the Constitution 
and the laws of war allow.6 Thus, several commission defen-
dants have argued that they fall outside the personal jurisdiction 
that the commissions may lawfully exercise, and that Congress 
also lacked the power to confer subject-matter jurisdiction over 
the offenses with which they have been charged. At least some 
of these “jurisdictional” challenges go to whether the defendants 
can be tried by military commissions at all — and, if they have 
a right not to be tried by commissions acting without jurisdic-
tion, whether that right can be vindicated before the potentially 
unlawful trial occurs. 
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The language of the MCA, though, purports to bar any col-
lateral attack — including habeas petitions — challenging the 
jurisdiction of the military tribunals. In particular, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950j(b) (part of section 3 of the MCA), provides that:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and not-
withstanding any other provision of law (including 
section 2241 of title 28 or any other habeas corpus 
provision), no court, justice, or judge shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim or cause 
of action whatsoever . . . relating to the prosecution, 
trial, or judgment of a military commission under this 
chapter, including challenges to the lawfulness of pro-
cedures of military commissions under this chapter.7
This essay takes up the question of the relationship between 
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cussion that follows explains, because a collateral challenge 
to military jurisdiction is tantamount to a challenge to “pure” 
executive detention, such lawsuits fall within the “core” of 
the Suspension Clause. In other words, the Suspension Clause 
necessarily protects a right not to be tried by a military commis-
sion acting without jurisdiction. And because, per Boumediene, 
the Suspension Clause “applies” to the Guantánamo detainees,8 
the only remaining question under the analysis the Court used in 
Boumediene is whether the MCA provides an adequate alterna-
tive remedy to vindicate a commission defendant’s right not to 
be tried. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has 
already held, though, the MCA provides commission defen-
dants with no interlocutory remedy, even where the challenge 
is to the commission’s jurisdiction.9 Thus, § 950j(b) precludes 
commission defendants from vindicating a right not to be tried 
until after the trial has occurred, and must therefore be uncon-
stitutional as so applied. Although this essay thus focuses on a 
largely doctrinal argument, such analysis is simply means to an 
end — to highlight the importance of collateral review in civil-
ian courts, especially where there are such serious questions as 
to whether the defendant is subject to military jurisdiction in the 
first place.
Part II begins with the argument that the Suspension Clause 
protects an ex ante right to collaterally attack the jurisdiction 
of a military court — a right not to be tried — by comparing 
such “jurisdictional” challenges to other contexts where the 
Supreme Court has recognized an analogous right. Part III turns 
to the MCA, and details how it precludes such collateral chal-
lenges — and thereby fails to provide a commission defendant 
with a meaningful opportunity to vindicate his right not to be 
tried. Finally, Part IV concludes by criticizing the one district 
court decision that has considered § 950j(b) to date — Judge 
Robertson’s denial of a request for a preliminary injunction in 
Hamdan v. Gates.10 Although Hamdan did not formally resolve 
the constitutionality of § 950j(b), Judge Robertson’s decision 
to abstain in favor of post-conviction proceedings frustrates 
the very right that Hamdan sought to vindicate, a right that the 
Suspension Clause necessarily protects.
ii. military triBunalS and the  
riGht not to Be tried
Over its history, the Supreme Court has issued a number of 
decisions reflecting a tacit recognition by the Court that col-
lateral challenges to military jurisdiction are not just properly 
brought through habeas petitions, but may well lie at the heart 
of the right that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause protects 
— a right to be free from unlawful executive detention. Thus, 
the question whether the Constitution protects a right not to be 
tried by a military commission acting without jurisdiction may 
have already been answered, albeit implicitly.
First, to the precedents: As Justice Scalia has admonished,
One must be careful . . . not to play word games with 
the concept of a “right not to be tried.” In one sense, 
any legal rule can be said to give rise to a “right not to 
be tried” if failure to observe it requires the trial court 
to dismiss the indictment or terminate the trial. . . . 
A right not to be tried . . . rests upon an explicit 
statutory or constitutional guarantee that trial will not 
occur . . . .11
Thus, the paradigmatic example of a right not to be tried 
is that conferred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, which provides that no person 
shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb.”12 It is not the conviction that violates the 
constitutional prohibition; it is the trial itself.13 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has never identified a parallel 
constitutional provision that guarantees that “trial will not occur” 
in the context of a military tribunal acting without jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, precedents dating back to the Founding recognize 
the ability — indeed, the responsibility — of the Article III 
courts to entertain collateral challenges to military jurisdiction,14 
along with the parallel notion that the Constitution limits both 
the personal and subject-matter jurisdiction of military commis-
sions.15
Most notably, in a series of cases decided during the 1950s, 
the Court repeatedly reached the merits of challenges to military 
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jurisdiction brought by U.S. citizens stationed (or related to 
someone stationed) overseas, even though there was a substan-
tial question as to whether the federal courts had statutory juris-
diction to entertain such lawsuits.16 Justice Scalia himself would 
later describe these decisions as recognizing that “constitutional 
doubt [over the availability of habeas corpus] . . . might indeed 
exist with regard to a citizen abroad — justifying a strained 
construction of the habeas statute, or (more honestly) a deter-
mination of constitutional right to habeas.”17 It wasn’t just that 
habeas corpus was available as of right to contest their deten-
tion; the writ was available as of right to test their amenability 
to military jurisdiction.
More than just recognizing that the Constitution might 
protect such a right, these cases also suggested that, for such a 
right to be meaningful, it had to be redressable ex ante. As the 
younger Justice Harlan would explain in Noyd v. Bond,18 the 
Court in these cases had not only entertained collateral attacks 
on the jurisdiction of the military courts, but had allowed such 
challenges to proceed without requiring that petitioners exhaust 
their remedies within the military court system. In his words, 
“it appeared especially unfair to require exhaustion of military 
remedies when the complainants raised substantial arguments 
denying the right of the military to try them at all.”19 
Moreover, such a reading of the Suspension Clause — as 
protecting a right to challenge military jurisdiction — makes 
practical sense; as part of the executive branch, military courts 
acting without jurisdiction implicate the same concerns as extra-
judicial executive detention — i.e., the executive is seeking to 
detain someone without the traditional safeguards attendant to 
judicial review by courts acting within their jurisdiction.
Thus, it is no surprise that, in another World War II-era 
decision rejecting on the merits a collateral attack on a military 
commission, the Supreme Court took pains to emphasize that 
Congress had not suspended habeas corpus, and that the Court 
thereby had the responsibility to inquire into the jurisdiction of 
the commission that tried and convicted the petitioner (and ulti-
mately sentenced him to death). As Chief Justice Vinson wrote, 
“[Congress] has not withdrawn, and the Executive branch of 
the government could not, unless there was suspension of the 
writ, withdraw from the courts the duty and power to make such 
inquiry into the authority of the commission as may be made by 
habeas corpus.”20
iii. collateral reVieW under the mca
In light of the above analysis, it should not take much con-
vincing to show that the MCA fails adequately to provide for 
collateral challenges to military jurisdiction. First, § 950j(b), 
quoted above, provides that “no court, justice, or judge shall 
have jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim or cause of action 
whatsoever . . . relating to the prosecution, trial, or judgment of 
a military commission under this chapter,” except as provided 
by the MCA.21 Moreover, the provision expressly includes 
habeas petitions within its scope, thus defeating any argument 
that Congress was insufficiently clear in manifesting its intent to 
preclude habeas review, in particular.22
Second, a defendant’s right to a statutory appeal under the 
MCA only allows him to challenge the “final” decision of the 
military commission. Such a narrow reading of the defendant’s 
right to appeal was confirmed by the D.C. Circuit in Khadr v. 
United States,23 perhaps the paradigm case for allowing an inter-
locutory appeal. In Khadr, the trial court had concluded that it 
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, on the ground 
that his “Combatant Status Review Tribunal” (CSRT) had deter-
mined only that he was an “enemy combatant,” not an “unlawful 
enemy combatant” as required by the jurisdiction-conferring 
provision of the MCA.24 The government took an interlocutory 
appeal to the “Court of Military Commission Review”25 (as 
provided by the MCA), which reversed the trial court. Khadr 
then sought to appeal that decision to the D.C. Circuit, only to 
have the Court of Appeals conclude that there was no authority 
in the MCA for a defendant to appeal any decision until and 
unless his conviction is confirmed by the convening authority. If 
no interlocutory appeal was available to a defendant in Khadr’s 
position, it is hard to imagine a case where such relief would be 
available.
Third, even if one viewed the right protected by the 
Suspension Clause more narrowly — as going to an ability to 
collaterally challenge military jurisdiction at some point, as 
opposed to ex ante, there are reasons even to doubt the efficacy 
of the MCA’s provisions concerning a post-conviction appeal. 
For starters, new 10 U.S.C. § 950g(c) appears intended to limit 
the scope of the D.C. Circuit’s review to whether the “final 
decision” is consistent with the standards and procedures speci-
fied by the MCA, and whether those standards and procedures 
are themselves consistent with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States. As Justice Kennedy wrote of similar language 
in Boumediene, “If Congress had envisioned [such] review as 
coextensive with traditional habeas corpus, it would not have 
drafted the statute in this manner.”26 
Indeed, missing from the scope of the D.C. Circuit’s appellate 
review are claims that the commission lacked jurisdiction over 
either the defendant or the subject-matter; that the commission’s 
standards and procedures violated the defendant’s treaty-based 
rights (including procedural rights conferred by the Geneva 
Conventions); and other challenges to collateral orders by the 
trial court not necessarily included with its “final decision.” And 
even if it is substantively adequate, the post-conviction appel-
late review for which the MCA provides is only triggered once 
the “convening authority” approves the “final decision” of the 
military commission, even though the statute nowhere specifies 
a timeframe within which such action must be taken.27 
The upshot of the above analysis, then, is that the MCA 
does not provide an adequate substitute to habeas corpus in two 
respects: First, it provides no opportunity — let alone an inad-
equate opportunity — for commission defendants meaningfully 
to vindicate their right not to be tried before the trial itself takes 
place. Second, it appears to provide an inadequate opportunity 
for the defendant to vindicate both those claims and other chal-
lenges to the proceedings after the fact. The MCA does not 
channel the defendant’s claims into a post-conviction appeal, 
as the government has argued;28 rather, it channels those claims 
into the very military process whose legitimacy is challenged, 
and provides no meaningful opportunity for independent review 
by the Article III courts. To suggest that it nevertheless provides 
an adequate substitute to habeas corpus is to turn the concept of 
adequate alternative remedies on its head. 
In all, there can be little question that the MCA plainly bars 
military commission defendants from collaterally challenging 
their amenability to military jurisdiction. The only possible 
challenge for which the MCA provides is one subsequent to the 
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defendant’s trial and conviction. And at that point, such review 
— even if it encompasses all potential claims — comes too late; 
the bell cannot be un-rung.
iV. HAmdAn and the mca’S larGer implicationS
All of these arguments were advanced to Judge Robertson 
in the Hamdan proceedings, where Hamdan’s counsel sought 
to have his trial by military commission stayed until he had a 
meaningful opportunity collaterally to contest the commission’s 
jurisdiction.29 And yet, rather than reach the merits of Hamdan’s 
argument — that the Suspension Clause protected his right to 
collaterally attack the jurisdiction of the military commission 
— Judge Robertson deferred. As he wrote,
The absence of a full-scale habeas hearing as to 
Hamdan’s classification as an unlawful enemy com-
batant does not, by itself, raise a substantial ques-
tion about the Commission’s jurisdiction to proceed. 
Moreover, under the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in 
Khadr, all of Hamdan’s jurisdictional arguments can 
be addressed, if necessary, following final judgment 
in accordance with § 950g. Where both Congress and 
the President have expressly decided when Article III 
review is to occur, the courts should be wary of dis-
turbing their judgment.30
Of course, Judge Robertson’s discussion misses the point, for 
it neglects the extent to which Hamdan claimed a right not to be 
tried — a claim that, as noted above, cannot be fully redressed 
“following final judgment.” Odder still, it was the same jurist 
in 2004 who found that precise argument compelling, ruling in 
Hamdan’s initial habeas petition that abstention was inappro-
priate on almost the same facts.31 As the D.C. Circuit noted in 
Hamdan’s case in 2005, “setting aside the judgment after trial 
and conviction insufficiently redresses the defendant’s right not 
to be tried by a tribunal that has no jurisdiction.”32 The only 
difference is the intervention of Congress in the form of the 
MCA, but it should go without saying that Congress has no 
more power to intrude upon a defendant’s constitutional right 
not to be tried than the President does, acting unilaterally. It may 
be that Hamdan was ultimately bound to lose on the merits of 
his collateral challenge — that his commission was acting with 
jurisdiction — but that conclusion cannot follow simply from 
the existence of the MCA.
* * *
The above discussion is rather technical, and may even 
strike the reader as bordering on legal semantics. Where the 
Guantánamo detainees are concerned, even a successful chal-
lenge to the jurisdiction of the military commission doesn’t 
do much to the status quo — on the government’s view, the 
defendant is still subject to detention (albeit without trial) as an 
“enemy combatant.” And the “right not to be tried” tends not to 
arise that often, or in a large enough number of cases so as to 
excite more than academic commentary.
But there are also distinct and palpable injuries suffered 
by defendants who are subjected to the process of courts act-
ing without jurisdiction, for they have to mount a defense (and 
perhaps even consider plea offers) in a regime the legitimacy of 
which they contest — and which may well be struck down on 
a post-conviction appeal. In mounting a defense, the defendant 
may have to produce evidence or provide statements that could 
be used against him in later proceedings. It is for these reasons 
that no court before Hamdan had ever precluded a defendant 
with a substantial challenge to the jurisdiction of a military 
tribunal from collaterally attacking that jurisdiction before trial, 
and why Boumediene’s extension of the Suspension Clause 
to Guantánamo compels the result that 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b) is 
unconstitutional to the extent that it prevents such a claim. After 
all, while it is troubling enough for Congress to create a system 
of military tribunals with personal and subject-matter jurisdic-
tion that runs so closely to — if not beyond — constitutional 
limits, it is simply indefensible for Congress to simultaneously 
preclude the Article III courts from enforcing those limits if and 
when they are transgressed.  HRB
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